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Alex Washburne, PhD's avatar

Biosecurity expert here, I think your article is as wrong as Noah’s.

Yes, computational design is hard. No, the transmissibility/lethality tradeoff is not guaranteed, especially not for cleverly made viruses. Virologists know how to do it, they just (thankfully) don’t include it in the training data. Great example is smallpox and a few other pathogens wiping out nearly 95% of native Americans.

There’s a reason the BWC was easy to negotiate in an era of nuclear proliferation: any country that has gone down this road has realized it’s the path to dooming humanity.

Bio is way worse than nukes for those of us who really know bio from a security perspective. LLMs might not be the enablers (thankfully they’re not trained on classified corpuses from bioweapons facilities of old, such as Russia’s smallpox work or some other agents I don’t even want to mention).

Noah’s article is wrong because it overestimates AI. Yours is wrong because it underestimates bio.

Ouchie's avatar

I think Noah’s difficulty is, like most writers, he cannot understand that some things are infinitely more complex than language.

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